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Trade Blocs, Interstate Conflict, and the
Collective Impact of Economic Integration
Matthew Shaffer

University of South Carolina

Abstract
Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or regional trade
agreements – have dramatically expanded in scope since World War II. While the proximate
goal of economic integration is to increase commercial exchange between member states, there
are strong reasons to believe integration influences relations across economic agreements as
well. I argue that economic agreements foster enclaves of regional interdependence at the
expense of multilateral, global interdependence. As a result, highly central economic agreements
are partially insulated from the ill-effects of militarized conflict with other agreement areas.
Furthermore, the coveted markets of highly central trade blocs afford them a degree of economic
leverage that increases the effectiveness of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms.
Ultimately, these dynamics suggest highly central agreements will tend to engage in conflict with
other central agreements due to the mutual isolation of said agreements. Relations between
central and marginalized agreements, however, will be more peaceful given the latter’s
dependence on access to central agreement markets. Using eigenvector centrality scores as my
primary measure of agreement centrality, I test my theory using a large-N statistical analysis. I
ultimately find support for the notion that dyads with more central agreements are more conflict
prone other types of dyads.

Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or regional
trade agreements – are cornerstones of commercial policy for states today in every region of the
world. By lowering commercial barriers, agreements increase trade and investment between
member states. As a consequence, the number of extant agreements now numbers close to threehundred unique arrangements with many more in various stages of negotiation. The proliferation
of agreements is accompanied by increasing complexity. Many economic agreements now
incorporate external trade policy harmonization and factor mobility in addition to standard trade
liberalization. In addition to increasing commercial exchange, states also gain from agreements
by increasing their bargaining power in multilateral negotiations and signaling political
commitment to particular policies. Furthermore, rhetoric from scholars and politicians alike
suggests that commercial integration is as valuable for peace and security as it is for economic
prosperity. French minister Robert Schuman, when advocating for the European Coal and Steel
Community, firmly believed in economic cooperation as a means to peace:
“By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions
will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the
realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the
preservation of peace.” (Schuman 1950)
While the effects of economic agreements on member states are general positive, giving
credence to policymaker’s claims, the aggregate welfare effect of their proliferation is a source
of debate. On one hand, economic agreements may serve as springboards to greater multilateral
openness and improve global economic efficiency. Regional integration affords states the
opportunity to work through trade issues with fewer players complicating the dynamic. On the
other, they may dampen individual states’ zeal for additional liberalization or simply fail to
create meaningful gains in efficiency. If member states prefer the sanctuary of the trade
agreement to increase competition from external states, this is likely the case. Furthermore, trade

agreements may simply divert trade from extra-agreement to intra-agreement sources without
improving economic efficiency. Consequently, while agreements may foster greater global
interdependence, they may also limit or even sever it in certain circumstances.
In this paper, I consider whether the proliferation of economic agreements and their
potential impact on global interdependence influences interstate conflict. A broader literature in
political science finds that interdependence tends to discourage conflict through various
mechanisms. If economic agreements act as vehicles or obstacles of interdependence, though,
we might expect them to influence the aggregate behavior of their member states. I specifically
argue that economic agreements create enclaves of interdependence that substitute regional for
global connectedness. While this may promote peace within the agreement itself, it likely sparks
inter-agreement conflict if member states are central members of the global trading network.
Hence, while economic agreements may promote the welfare and security of states within the
agreement, they may sacrifice extra-agreement security with ambiguous overall implications.
My research, therefore, provides important insight into the political ramifications of economic
agreements as one of the most dynamic trends in international relations.
In the sections that follow, I lay out my argument and empirically test it using a large-N
study. The next section briefly surveys the existing literature on economic interdependence and
interstate conflict. Following this, I present my theory arguing that economic agreements restrict
or sever global interdependence, thereby encouraging inter-agreement conflict. I then offer
empirical assessment of my theory using statistical analysis. Ultimately, I find that agreements
comprised of highly central states are more likely to engage in conflict with each other than with
less central states. I conclude with some policy implications and avenues of future research.

Economic Integration and Interdependence
Economic integration agreement, as I use the term, refers to institutions removing barriers
to commercial exchange. In general, this is broadly similar to the conventional use of regional
trade agreements. The World Trade Organization (WTO) defines a regional trade agreement as a
territory that maintains separate tariffs or regulations for a “substantial part of the trade of such
territory” (WTO 1947, Article XXIV). This definition distinguishes regional economic
agreements from more universal arrangements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
or the WTO in that, first, it liberalizes beyond WTO standards and, second, membership is
restricted. Through this paper I use the terms economic agreement, trade bloc, and regional trade
agreement interchangeably, as they refer to the same basic entity.
Economic integration agreements typically offer substantial commercial advantages for
member states. By reducing the barriers to commerce, goods and services flow more freely
between member states owing to lower overall transaction costs. The potential gains from
removing obstacles increase as the scope and depth of activities covered in agreements expands.
Indeed, a robust body of literature exists in economics and political science details the
ramifications of commercial integration. First, agreements tend to increase trade between
member states due to reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers (Baier and Bergstrang 2007;
Carrere 2006). Second, the convergence of intra-agreement trade policy resulting from lowering
barriers implicitly broadens the markets of member states. This is analogous to an exogenous
increase in the size of domestic markets. Larger markets created by economic agreements may
increase foreign direct investment into member states as corporations look to exploit newly
realized economics of scale (Joumotte 2004). Finally, agreements are often “sticky” or difficult
to rescind without suffering consequences from members states and domestic and international

markets in general. In this way commercial agreements act as constraints on decision-makers
and bind domestic policies to more open, liberal orientations (Whalley 1996). Accession to an
agreement is therefore a signal of specific policy intentions (Fernandez and Portes 1998; Schiff
and Winters 1998).
Overall, as a result of these mechanisms, economic agreements foster interdependence
between member states in ways that are thought to reduce conflict between members. Stemming
from Immanuel Kant, who believed economic interdependence reinforced legal systems and
socialized states to prefer cooperation rather than conflict (1991 [1795]), may have argued the
pacifying effects of interdependence. The most developed branch of this argument holds that
trade between nations confers tangible, material gains that provide incentives to avoid conflict.
In short, benefits accrue to states engaged in trade through the mutual exchange of goods. War
puts at risk these commercial ties and chances the long-term prosperity of the relationship. Trade
therefore reduces conflict through opportunity costs insomuch as trade is disrupted by war
(Polachek 1992; Russett and Oneal 1997; 1999a; 1999b; 2001 for confirmatory evidence; See
Barbieri 1996, 2002 for contrasting conclusions). Additionally, more in line with Kant’s original
thoughts, trade may pacify states through a socialization process that encourages the acquisition
of resources through exchange rather than conquest (Keohane and Nye 1977; Rosecrance 1986;
Hegre 2000). Somewhat underdeveloped as a mechanism is the possibility that economic
interdependence increases the effectiveness of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms (Stein
2003). In other words, policies short of war may be substituted to achieve foreign policy goals.
For example, economic sanctions may be used to selectively harm the economy of another state
if interdependence is sufficiently high (Baldwin 1985, 189-195; Baldwin 1993; Whalley 1996;
Mastanduno 2003, 176; Morrow 2003, 91). War is therefore unnecessary between

interdependent states. For their part, the literature specifically addressing economic agreements
finds they too encourage peace by reinforcing interdependence (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000;
Bearce 2003; Bearce and Omari 2005; Haftel 2007).
Economic integration does not exist in a vacuum, however. Agreements can profoundly
affect the global trading landscape by altering commercial dynamics between states. On one
hand, agreements may simply divert trade from non-members to members without actually
increasing aggregate trade flows. This process was first identified by Viner (1950). In short,
goods are shifted from lower- to higher-cost producers due exclusively to the selective removal
of trade restrictions (Viner 1950; Krugman 1991; 1999; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret
2001). Empirically, numerous studies either using gravity models to predict baseline levels of
trade or case studies identify trade diversion across several trade agreements (see Schiff and
Winters 2003, 190 for a review, as well as Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1995; Eichengreen and
Frankel 1995; Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland 1996; Yeats 1997; Gupta and Schiff 1997; Chang
and Winters 2002; Magee 2008). Consequently, trade agreements may create or perpetuate
economic distortions rather than foster efficiency.
Perhaps more importantly, however, are the broader political implications of economic
integration. Trade agreements can also incentivize protectionism among agreement members
vis-à-vis the external world. Depending on the agreement type, barriers between members and
non-members may actually increase once agreements are signed (Viner 1950). Indeed, Krugman
(1989; 1991; 1993) and Schiff and Winters (1998) show formally that agreement members have
strong incentives to raise external barriers and generate trade diversion as a welfare-maximizing
strategy and means to improve their terms of trade. Regional agreements may also be hindering
multilateral trade liberalization and thereby limiting global interdependence. Indeed, the larger

the RTA, the more inward looking it may become, and conclude that the additional members or
further liberalization will not benefit the group significantly (Bhagwati and Panagariya 1999;
Krugman 1999). Krugman (1991) demonstrates formally the relationship between agreement
size and demand for liberalization. The optimal strategy of relatively large agreements is to limit
exposure to the external world, thereby maximizing internal gains. Newly minted economic
agreements may therefore pursue more aggressive trade policies in an effort to leverage
aggregate market power. Indeed, the subdued role of the European Community in 1982
multilateral trade negotiations may have reflected contentment with the progression of internal
trade agreements to date.1 Likewise, many economic agreements in the 1980s and early 1990s
were specifically created to counter Japanese economic influence (Bergsten 1991).
Finally, despite the fact that it is bad economic theory, trade diversion may be good
politics. Constituencies within agreement members that benefit from trade diversion have strong
incentives to maintain and accelerate the process (Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998). This effect is
most pronounced within agreements where states possess similar factor endowments (Levy
1997). As an example, Brazil lobbied heavily for the inclusion of extensive information
technology trade liberalization in MERCOSUR negotiations, but subsequently opposed a similar
potential multilateral agreement (Schiff and Winters 2003, 72).
While extant political science research has focused on the intra-agreement influence of
economic integration, a robust economics literature suggests their potentially effects on extraagreement dynamics are equally profound. If trade blocs are indeed substitutes for far-reaching,
multilateral economic liberalization, then the pacifying effects of interdependence may be
limited or severed. In the next section, I consider the possible influence of integration on
interstate conflict at the agreement level.
1

Bhagwati, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview” 21, 24; Schiff and Winters 204.

Trade Blocs and Interstate Conflict
Regional economic agreements, in many ways, are substitutes for broad, multilateral
liberalization. Insofar as international trade is characterized (by policymakers, at least) as a
prisoner’s dilemma, states desire agreements to ensure reciprocal trade concessions. When
global agreements – like those under the auspices of the World Trade Organization – are not
feasible or slow to mature, states often seek arrangements with proximate or important trade
partners. Often times, as a robust literature in economics indicates, multilateral liberalization is
less likely as a result. Consequently, states entering into regional economic agreements purchase
regional at the expense of multilateral interdependence. This process affects conflict behavior by
reducing the salience of extra-agreement commercial ties and lowering the relative cost of
conflict between trade blocs. Not all agreements are equal, however. Highly central agreements
comprised of important trading states are likely the most affected by this process. Marginalized
agreements with peripheral states, in contrast, are still dependent in the global trading system.
Consequently, central agreements are more conflict prone than others.
Reduced Salience of Inter-agreement Commercial Ties
As noted, economic agreements tend to promote commercial exchange by reducing
barriers between member states. As a result, the salience of economic relationships between
agreement members increases. Trade is the most basic type of relationship changed by economic
integration. As tariffs, quotas, and regulations within agreements fall, the total amount of
bilateral trade between members likely increases as states realize comparative advantages,
economies of scale, and increased efficiency from production (Viner 1950). The formal
arrangement of economic agreements also implies expectations about future interactions and
policies. States that sign agreements both signal the importance of their commercial relationship

and the desire to see it develop further. In other words, states seek economic agreements to lockin and enhance access to markets they view as important and critical for future development
(Whalley 1996; Schiff and Winters 1998). Given these factors, members likely identify their
long-term economic interests with those of the agreement broadly and its constituent states.
Economic agreements, however, foster this regional interdependence at the expense of
interdependence with the rest of the world. The implication of the increased salience of ties
between agreement members is a corresponding decrease in salience with other trade blocs.
Shifting sources of imports and markets for export from non-members to members necessarily
decreases the relative importance of those ties. Alternatively stated, agreement members tend to
rely on partner states for greater portions of their trade portfolio. Members therefore rely on
other trade blocs less for commercial viability and overall trade. Furthermore, material exchange
does not necessarily have to decrease between members and non-members of agreements
provided expectations of greater exchange or policy stability are generated. The more states look
to the agreement for future commercial relations the less important become other agreements.
This is particularly true to the extent economic agreements encourage protectionist policies.
Economic agreements that raise barriers to trade both reduce the material exchange between
trade blocs and signal intentions of future policies and goals. The marginalization of interagreement ties is also compounded if trade diversion occurs. Agreements that draw trade
internally at the expense of external parties or other trade blocs further reduce the importance of
inter-agreement linkages. Trade diverting agreements, furthermore, have incentive to further
marginalize the world and stymie interdependence (Winters 1996; Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998).
In turn, the marginalization of economic ties between economic agreement members and
non-members influences conflict behavior by reducing its opportunity cost. One of the important

reasons interdependence reduces conflict is the forgone benefits states incur by engaging in
combat (Polachek, 1980; Doyle 1997). By diversifying trade partners, or even emphasizing
certain ties over others, states necessarily decrease dependence on any one source. Martin,
Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) argue that decreases in systemic trade costs, part of which is
associated with barriers, reduce the multilateral impact of bilateral conflict. That is, lower
systemic trade costs allow states to shift trade to other nations thus reducing the negative
externalities of conflict. Consequently, as economic agreements reduce trade costs for members,
the ability of members to leverage intra-agreement ties in potentially absorbing excess trade
affected by hostilities with non-members reduces the overall cost of those conflicts. In a way,
economic agreements create trade sanctuaries the partially insulate their members of the negative
effects of conflict with states in other trade agreements. Having a place in a ready-made,
codified trade network reduces the ill-effects of trade disruptions with non-agreement members.
Given the overall marginalization of ties between agreement members and non-members, the
deterrence influence of conflict is restricted. Hence, just as self-reliant states likely suffer less
from conflict and therefore employ it more frequently (Maoz 2006), we might expect more selfreliant trade blocs to experience more conflict through similar mechanisms. The notion that
trade deters conflict is also in part based on a long-term expectation future trade relations will be
hurt by war (Barbieri and Levy 1999). By erecting an implicit barrier between members and
non-members, economic agreements marginalize the future utility of trading relationships in
ways that similarly impede their deterrent effect.
Agreement Centrality and Conflict Propensities
The extent to which economic agreements affect the interdependence of member states
with the external world is not uniform across trade blocs, however. Economic agreements are

comprised of different trade partners and possess unique attributes that profoundly affect their
aggregate impact on member-state behavior. As the economic literature indicates, larger trade
blocs are expected to act differently vis-à-vis the external world than smaller ones. In many
ways this is a direct function of their realized or potential economic leverage. Consequently, as I
will argue, trade blocs that occupy a central location in the global trade network are more selfreliant and autonomous. As a consequence, central agreements are likely more conflict prone.
Economic agreements, in reality, are a highly heterogeneous lot in terms of state
composition, issue coverage, and overall objective and goals. Trade blocs tend to divide
regionally based simply on the tendency for major trade partners to be spatially clustered and the
political feasibility of penning agreements with familiar states. The geographic clustering of
agreements can result in either a highly homogenous set of states (such as most African
agreements) or a hub-and-spoke style of organization where one state is clearly the dominant
trade partner (like the Commonwealth of Independent States around Russia or the South African
Customs Union around South Africa). Likewise, issue coverage is quite diverse. While all
agreements address trade to some extent, some go further to include the creation of common
external tariffs or the free movement of labor and capital. Agreement objectives are often
multifaceted and complex. At the most basic level, all agreements want to increase trade
between members. That said, the reason for doing so is often different. Several early South
American agreements sought the creation of self-sufficient areas through import substitution
programs. Others, like the early incarnations of the European integration, sought internal
security through interdependence.
Heterogeneity between economic agreements in these capacities results in a varied set of
unique characteristics. Some trade blocs are comprised of very important states in the global

trading system linked together for political and economic reasons. Other blocs contain smaller,
more marginalized states motivated by the implicitly larger market created by economic
agreements. Following from this heterogeneity, the economic leverage of a trade bloc as a whole
is derived both from the attributes of its constituent states and their position within the global
trade network. In turn, the degree to which an economic agreement fosters an enclave of
interdependence is in part a reflection of these attributes.
Consider first highly central economic agreements comprised of states at the core of the
global trade network. Central trade blocs possess states that trade with a majority of the world
and have extensive intra-agreement ties. These characteristics afford them substantial leverage
in two distinct ways. First, highly central agreements sit in coveted positions of the trade
network where market access can be wielded as power (explicitly or implicitly). Trade blocs
implicitly cordons off the external world if only by defining the limits of member-states’
economic openness (Baldwin 1993). Furthermore, the creation of an economic agreement
creates a relatively larger market for potential firms looking to invest or trade (Joumotte 2004).
Access to a central agreement gains states and their constituent businesses entrée to highly
connected, relatively large trading states. As a consequence, states excluded from the central
agreement likely desire access to the central agreement’s markets. This is evidenced in part by
the zeal with which many states have courted “Fortress Europe” and the creation of the Central
American Free Trade Agreement in the wake its North American counterpart. Second, central
agreements are better able to utilize economic power in conflict. On one hand, as argued,
agreements afford member sanctuaries from the ill-effects of conflict. The ill-effects of conflict
are mitigated to the extent states can leverage their trade bloc to divert forgone trade. On the
other hand, central agreements can actively wield economic power by controlling market access.

Central trade blocs, by virtue of their relatively large, highly desirable markets, can coordination
sanctions effectively to compel policy change in target states. Indeed, several trade blocs have
pursued coordinated action against non-member states, including the European Union and
Economic Community of West African States (Blunt 2005; European Union 2008).
Consider now marginalized trade agreements that are less central to the global trading
system. First, market access to less central agreements is relatively less desirable than for central
agreements. Their position on the fringe of the global trade network is less valuable or sought
after by other states or areas. Losing access to a marginalized agreement, in other words, is less
likely to significantly impact other states or agreements. Furthermore, marginalized agreements
are more likely to depend on the core of the global trading system. On one hand, more
peripheral trade blocs are more likely to depend on access to a few, highly central states for
export markets. On the other, even if this is not the case, states in marginalized agreements
likely desire access to more central agreements in order to bolster or diversify their trade
network. Consequently, marginalized agreements are less salient than central ones in the global
trading system. Furthermore, less central agreements possess less economic leverage with which
to coerce other states. Their smaller trade network indicates, first, they have fewer ties from
which to leverage economic power and, second, possess less maximal force when coercing.
The dichotomy between central and marginalized trade agreements suggests important
differences in conflict behavior when paired dyadically. Central agreements benefit from
possessing desired positions in the trade network and high economic leverage. When two central
trade blocs square off, however, these characteristics are limited or mitigated. First, because
both agreements possess highly salient trade networks from their bloc, we might expect both to
be insulated from the cost of conflict to some degree. Furthermore, while central agreements

likely still desire access to other central agreements, it is not as imperative as for less central
agreements. Highly central trade blocs that contain salient states are robust trade are less
interdependent with other blocs or areas of the world as a result. Consequently, as the cost of
conflict is less on both sides of the conflict, the use of force is more likely to occur. Second, for
many of the same reasons, economic coercion that is enabled by highly central trade agreements
is less effective against other central agreements. Central agreements are less interdependent
with the rest of the world, and as a consequence are less affected by the imposition of sanctions
or their long-term effects. The reduced effectiveness of economic coercion between highly
central agreements decreases the likelihood they are employed. As a result, military force may
be the only viable option with which members of central agreements may coerce members of
opposing trade blocs. For this reasons, we might expect relations between highly central
economic agreements to be more conflict prone than with less central agreements:
H1: Highly central agreements are more likely to engage in conflict with other highly central
agreements than less central ones.
Relations between highly central and marginalized states, in contrast, are likely less
conflict prone. First, marginalized agreements are still dependent to some extent on central trade
blocs. They either depend on markets in certain central areas or aspire to preferential access.
Conflict against central trade blocs for marginalized trade blocs, therefore, can be costly in the
short- and long-run. Second, economic coercion is more effective against marginalized trade
blocs. Less central trade blocs possess fewer alternatives to shift trade lost by sanctions because
their intra-agreement trade networks are less developed and market access to central agreements
is proportionally more salient. Economic sanctions are therefore more effective when central
trade blocs target marginalized ones by virtue of the latter’s lack of options (Hirschman 1981).
Consequently, when marginalized agreements are confronted by more central ones, they likely

capitulate either without coercion or once economic force is applied. The result of dynamics
between central and marginalized trade blocs leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: Less central agreements are less likely to engage in conflict with highly central agreements
than equally central ones.
Conceptualization and Operationalization
To empirically test my theory that economic agreements influence conflict between trade
blocs, I use a large-N statistical analysis of economic agreements from 1950 to 2001. I structure
the dataset dyadically such that my unit of analysis is agreement dyad-years. My dependent
variable is the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute between two different economic
agreements. I code this variable 1 if dispute occurs between agreements in a given year and 0
otherwise.2 I obtain data for this variable from the Maoz dyadic MID dataset (Maoz 2005).
My theory hinges on the centrality and salience of economic agreements. I specify two
primary explanatory variables to address these characteristics of agreements. First, the centrality
of an economic agreement refers directly to its position within the global trading system. More
central states and agreements, I argue, command greater weight and wield more influence than
less central ones. As this is network data, I employ a standard measure used in network analysis
studies to reflect the centrality or importance of a state within the global trading network.
Specifically, I capture the economic agreement centrality through the use of averaged
eigenvector centrality scores of its constituent states. I consider two states to be connected if
they trade during a given year. Ties are constructed using trade data from Barbieri, Keshk, and
Pollins (2008).

2

Approximately 10% of agreement dyads that experience MIDs experience multiple MIDs in a given year. While
dichotomization discards these multiple MIDs, the relative infrequency of multiple occurrences limits the inferential
impact of doing so. I also conducted analysis using a zero-inflated binomial count model. The results were not
substantially different from the logit models reported in this paper.

Eigenvector centrality builds off simple degree centrality, which measures only the
proportion a node’s extant ties over all possible ties, by incorporating the centrality of all other
nodes connected to one particular node. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality is:
Ax  x

Where A is an adjacency matrix (where 1 indicates two nodes are connected), x is a
centrality vector and  is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues that maximize the equation
(Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001). Eigenvector centrality therefore accounts not only for how
connected a particular state is, but also how connected are its trade partners. Intuitively, a state
that trades with dozens of peripheral states might not be as economically central as a state that
trades with only a handful of the most central states in the system. While the former has
influence with several other states with whom it trades, that influence does not go very far due to
the trade partners relatively limited connections. The latter, on the other hand, although it only
has ties with a few other states, each of those states has a great deal of influence internationally
due to their extensive connections. In other words, a state’s centrality is proportional to the
weighted sum of the states to which it is connected. I use the Maoz Social Network Program
developed by Zeev Maoz’ to derive eigenvector centrality scores for each state-year. I then
average the scores of member states to arrive at an aggregated, agreement-level variable.3
My second primary explanatory variable addresses the aggregate economic weight of an
agreement. The economic influence an agreement possesses is in part a reflection of how much
trade it conducts. That is, agreements that foster relatively substantial amounts of trade are more
influential than agreements that do not cover large areas of trade. To operationalize this, I
calculate the total trade (imports + exports) occurring between states in an agreement per year
3

I conducted robustness tests by including the standard deviation of centrality scores (and interactions with average
centrality) in each statistical model to account for the cohesion of agreements themselves. The results did not
deviate significant from those reported here.

using the aforementioned trade data from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2008). Total trade is then
divided by the sum on agreement members’ GDP to arrive at a normalized measure. I use GDP
data from Gleditsch (2002).
Both the centrality and intra-agreement trade measures are then treated differently in two
separate empirical models. The first model uses the weak-link assumption by including only the
lowest values eigenvector centrality and intra-agreement trade in the dyad. My expectation is
that these variables will positively correlate with the initiation of MIDs. This approach allows
inference into whether highly central and/or salient agreement dyads engage in conflict. It does
not, however, capture the relative positions of agreements completely, thereby rendering it illsuited for hypothesis 2. I thus include a second model that uses the ratio of eigenvector
centrality scores and intra-agreement trade (which is not normalized on GDP) within the
agreement dyad by dividing the lowest value over the highest. The resulting measure is bound
between zero and one with higher scores indicating more symmetry between agreements. This
allows a more direct analysis of hypothesis 2 regarding the relationship between agreements of
different status. I also expect the ratio measures will be positively correlated with MID onset.
I also use a number of control variables to account for competing explanations of conflict
between trade blocs. Many of these variables are aggregations of dyadic measures seen in the
prevailing conflict literature. First, I control for the relative capabilities of trade blocs using
composite index of national capabilities (CINC) scores from the Correlates of War dataset. The
measure is calculated as the sum of capabilities across members for each agreement, then made
relational by dividing the smaller by the larger figure. I obtain data from the Correlates of War
(Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Singer 1987). Second, in accordance with the democratic peace
literature, I control for regime type with average democracy scores for members in an agreement

using data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2007). I only include the
lowest democracy score in the agreement dyad in according with the weak-link assumption.
Third, industrialization or absolute economic size may also influence conflict between
agreements, as economically large areas more readily possess the means to wage war.
Consequently, I control for the overall economic power of agreements using the sum of
members’ GDP. Only the lowest GDP score is included in my analysis. Fourth, as my theory
addresses directly economic interdependence between agreement areas, I include a traditional
variable for interdependence measured as the sum of bilateral trade between members of two
separate agreements as a share of summed GDP. The lowest score is included in the statistical
model to reflect the degree of dyadic agreement interdependence. Fifth, my theory specifically
references the accessibility of economic agreements as an influence on conflict. To account for
this, I include a variable for total agreement external openness measured as the sum of members’
total national trade (less intra-agreement trade) as a share of summed GDP. The resulting
measure captures the extent to which external parties can freely trade with the agreement area.
Finally, because agreements are not symmetric, I include a count of the number of states in a
dyad. This accounts for the logical notion that agreements with more states are more likely to
engage in conflict by virtue of greater opportunities for conflict.
Estimation and Results
After account for missing data, my analysis includes approximately 16,000 agreement
dyads. MIDs and sanctions occur in less than 3% of observations. Because my dependent
variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression with robust standard errors for statistical
analysis.4 I also lag all independent variables one year to help control for endogeneity and

4

Given the relative rarity with which disputes occur (less than 3% of cases), I use rare events logistic regression
developed by King, Tomz, and Zeng (1999) as a robustness check. The results are identical to those reported here.

protect the temporal integrity of the analysis. Finally, I include a cubic polynomial variable
capturing the number of years between militarized disputes between agreement dyads to address
potential dependencies between conflict events (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and
Signiorino 2010).
---- Table 1 Approximately Here ---Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for all variables in my analysis. Focusing on the
primary independent variables, the weak-link centrality has a mean of 9.113 with a fairly tight
standard deviation. At the extreme end, however, the most central states easily double the mean
score. Relative centrality is also normally distributed with a mean of approximately 0.75. The
intra-agreement trade variables reveal some interesting patterns. First, looking at the weak-link
variable that measures intra-agreement trade as a share of agreement GDP, it appears some
agreements fail to generate meaningful intra-agreement trade. Indeed, the average of all
agreements is approximately 0.2% of GDP, although some cover as much as 10% of agreement
GDP. The ratio of intra-agreement trade, furthermore, is right skewed with a mean of 0.226.
Asymmetry between agreements is therefore manifest mostly in the trade they engender.
---- Table 2 Approximately Here ---Table 2 contains the results of the logit estimations for both models. Consider first the
weak-link model capturing centrality as the lowest score in the dyad. The centrality variable is
positive and significant, indicating that more central agreements are more likely to initiate MIDS
against relatively more central agreements. This suggests that the more central an agreement is,
the less interdependent it is with other agreement areas and regions. As a result, the cost of
conflict is lower for central agreements. As a result, when two central agreements experience
conflict, the probability of it militarizing increases. Intra-agreement trade, however, fails to

achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. Consequently, it does not appear that the
aggregate size of the agreements factors meaningfully into their conflict behavior.
Turning to the relative centrality and intra-agreement trade model, we see similar results.
The relative centrality variable is positive and significant, indicating that the more symmetric
agreements are, the more likely they are to engage in conflict. By implication, asymmetric
agreement relations are less likely to result in militarized conflict. This lends support to my
argument that the most conflict-prone inter-agreement relations are those between central trade
blocs. Disputes between one highly central and one marginalized agreement are likely to result
in the capitulation of the latter prior to or with limited coercion. In contrast, when two central
agreements conflict, it is more likely both trade blocs prefer militarized conflict to acquiescence.
This would also seem to indicate, consistent with my theory, that less central agreements are
more likely to fight their peers than central agreements. As with the weak-link model, however,
the intra-agreement trade ratio variable fails to achieve statistical significance.
Two different substantive interpretations are offered in this paper. First, the last column
of Table 2 includes the change in the predicted probability of observing a MID when the variable
of interest moves from the first to third quartile. A shift from the first quartile of agreement
centrality using the weak-link assumption to the third quartile – from roughly the South
American Customs Union to the Arab Common Market – increases the probability of a MID by
17.1%. This effect is not insignificance, as it approximately doubles the effect of GDP on
conflict probability. Likewise, a shift from the first to third quartile of relative agreement
centrality increases the probability of conflict by 23.1%. This is equivalent to the shift between
the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (which centers on Russia) relations with Central
European Free Trade Association (which includes many former Soviet Satellites) on one hand

and the European Free Trade Area (including non-EU European states) on the other. Once
again, this effect is not insignificant compared to other variables, as it outweighs the substantive
effect of both GDP and openness.
---- Figures 1 and 2 Approximately Here ---The second means of interpretation is contained in Figures 1 and 2, which plot the
predicted probabilities of conflict against agreement centrality in both models. Looking at
Figure 1 first, which reflects the weak-link model, the probability of a MID increases in tandem
with agreement centrality until a value of approximately 15. At this point, the effect plateaus
before a decline. Rather than a non-linear affect, this likely reflects the paucity of observations
at the tail of the graph.5 It is also important to note that the confidence intervals of the graphs do
not contain zero at any point, indicating the substantive impact of centrality is meaningful across
the full range of possible values. Figure 2, which plots the relative centrality measure, indicates
the same basic trend. More symmetric trade agreement centrality increases the probability of
militarized conflict. This effect, furthermore, is significant across the range of possible values.
Turning briefly to the other variables in my analysis, some interesting results emerge.
First, agreements of relatively equal capabilities are more likely to engage in conflict. This
makes intuitive sense, as agreements of similar size are more likely to “like their odds” in
combat. Second, consistent with the democratic peace literature, the more democratic the
agreement dyad, the less likely it is to engage in military conflict. Third, higher values of trade
between agreement areas actually increase the probability of conflict. This may reflect the
severing of interdependence between agreement areas such that even bilateral links fail to
prevent conflict. Fourth, the more developed the agreements, the more likely they are to
experience military force, likely resulting from their ability to wage war. Fifth, as might be
5

A polynomial term was tested in the model, but did not achieve significance.

expected, dyads with more members are more likely to experience conflict owing to the increase
opportunity to do so. Finally, openness only achieves significance in the relative centrality
model. Its coefficient is negative, indicating that more open agreements are less likely to
experience conflict. This comports with my notion that agreements maintaining interdependence
with other areas are less likely to see conflict as a viable option.
Overall, the results of my statistical analysis support the two hypotheses presented.
Dyads comprised of highly central agreements are more likely to experience militarized conflict
by virtue of the positive and significant coefficients in both the weak-link and relative centrality
models. This suggests that highly central trade blocs are insulated in part from the ill-effects of
conflict, and therefore are more apt to use it in disputes. Likewise, marginalized agreements are
less likely to conflict with central ones given the positive and significant coefficient on the
relative centrality measure. Less central agreements are more likely to capitulate to central ones
in disputes, as they are more dependent on access to large markets for future economic success.
Hence, agreements of roughly equal centrality are the most conflict prone. As a result of these
findings, I find support for both hypotheses 1 and 2.
Estimation and Results
At the outset of this paper, I ask whether the proliferation of economic agreements
influenced interstate conflict in meaningful ways. The answer to this question appears to be
“yes,” as more central economic agreements tend to experience more tension than other types of
trade blocs. As highly central, salient states form trade agreements, they foster enclaves of
regional interdependence at the expensive of more systemic, multilateral interdependence. The
result is a generally lower cost of conflict for central agreements given their development of
trade sanctuaries through economic agreements. When facing each other, consequently, two

central trade blocs are more likely to see military force as a viable policy option. Marginalized
agreements, however, are still dependent on access to central areas. In turn, when facing a
dispute with central agreements, they capitulate with little or no coercion applied.
Overall, the results from my empirical analysis suggest a number of interesting
conclusions and important implications. First, in line with one particular segment of economics
literature, the impact of regional trade agreements appears to be more divisive than unifying.
While this paper does not indicate what a world without economic agreements looks like, it does
suggest that the proliferation of agreements has not pacified relations between the most central
agreements. Second, my results also have interesting implications for the liberal peace. In many
ways my theory and analysis supports the important pacifying forces behind arguments of
interdependence and conflict. Exclusion from economic agreements, I argue, reduces
interdependence and the salience of trade ties. Consequently, integration severs the mechanisms
by which the liberal peace operates between agreement areas. The core of liberalism is clearly
intact and, indeed, is augmented by my analysis. What I do, however, is refine the conditions
under which economic liberalism may succeed in preventing conflict between states. Economic
integration may create security externalities for states if they significantly reduce the importance
of external ties. Consequently, if my work criticizes the liberal peace, it is only by stating that
the structure of trade relationships mattes for conflict in certain situations. Hence, not all trade
openness can be expected to purchase a state security. Indeed, those states that seek economic
integration as part of a security plan aimed at excluded states are likely to exacerbate conflict and
strategic rivalry.
Overall, my analysis has two major contributions for scholarship and policy. First, it
contributes to the growing body of literature exploring the effects of economic integration on

interstate conflict. While integration may pacify internal relations, as previous literature
suggests, it may involve a tradeoff vis-à-vis external security. Second, in a related manner, my
analysis addresses a generally neglected area of international relations. Specifically, how might
the existence and operation of finite international institutions influence states excluded from
membership? State decisions to seek integration are strategic choices that necessarily exclude
certain parties. It follows, therefore, that institutions may have as profound consequences for
non-members as they do members. I provide one piece of what might be a dynamic and
interested research program.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable

MIDs

Frequency
Percentage

0
1
(None) (Initiated)
15,934
331
97.96%
2.04%

Independent Variables
Mean
Centrality
Intra-Agreement Trade
Relative Centrality
Relative Intra-agreement
Trade
Capabilities
Democracy
Openness
Bilateral Trade
GDP ($ billions)
Total Members

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Median

Maximum

9.113
0.002
0.751

2.214
0.004
0.162

3.729
0.000
0.187

8.688
0.001
0.767

20.805
0.096
1.000

0.226
0.269
-0.817
0.144
0.003
247.000
10.659

0.260
0.278
5.588
0.088
0.012
514.000
7.240

0.000
<0.001
-9.667
0.000
0.000
1.120
2.000

0.116
0.152
-1.200
0.131
0.001
54.500
9.000

1.000
0.999
10.000
0.734
0.260
9,320.000
45.000

Table 2: Agreement Centrality and Interstate Conflict
Lowest Agreement Centrality and Trade
Coefficient
CentralityLow

Standard Error

Change in MID Probability
(First to Third Quartile)

0.069*

0.030

17.1%

Intra-agreement TradeLow
Capabilities

-10.17
0.930***

10.922
0.203

----35.2%

DemocracyLow

-0.052***

0.012

-52.1%

OpennessLow

-1.274

0.686

-----

Bilateral TradeLow

8.627*

3.444

0.8%

0.001***
0.059***
-4.613***
16,264
0.1152
1430.41

0.000
0.006
0.325

8.4%
60.4%
-----

GDPLow
Total Members
Constant
N
Pseudo-R2
Log pseudolikelihood

Relative Agreement Centrality and Trade
Change in MID Probability
(First to Third Quartile)
23.1%
----30.0%

Coefficient
0.924*
-0.379
0.794***

Standard Error
0.401
0.239
0.203

DemocracyLow

-0.049***

0.012

-48.8%

OpennessLow

-1.503*

0.703

-16.0%

Bilateral TradeLow

9.869**

3.630

0.9%

0.000
0.006
0.360

8.6%
63.6%
-----

Relative Centrality
Relative Intra-agreement Trade
Capabilities

GDPLow
Total Members
Constant
N
Pseudo-R2
Log pseudolikelihood

0.001***
0.058***
-4.585***
16,190
0.1153
-1398.01

Dependent variable refers to the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute (MID); Estimates produced using logit and verified with
rare-events logit; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Predicted probabilities calculated by holding all variables at thier mean
values while manipulating the variable of interest. * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Figure 1: Centrality and Conflict Probability
.05

.04

.03

.02

.01

0
5

10
15
Agreement Eigenvector Centrality

20

Figure 2: Relative Centrality and Conflict Probability
.04

.03

.02

.01

0
0

.2
.4
.6
.8
Relative Agreement Centrality

1

